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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
 U.S. manufacturing 
experienced unprecedented 
employment declines
in the 2000s. 
 Strong output and 
productivity growth in
manufacturing are oft en
cited as evidence that U.S.
manufacturing is doing 
well and that automation
is primarily responsible for 
the employment declines. 
A careful look at the 
evidence does not support 
this popular view.
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Th e manufacturing sector experienced a 
precipitous and historically unprecedented decline 
in employment in the 2000s, which coincided 
with a surge in imports, weak growth in exports, 
and a yawning trade defi cit. Th e sharp job losses 
in manufacturing signifi cantly contributed to the 
weak employment growth and low labor force 
participation characterizing the U.S. economy for 
much of this period. 
Th e plight of U.S. manufacturing featured 
prominently in the 2016 presidential election, with 
candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 
arguing that globalization had severely damaged 
U.S. factories and workers. Th at message resonated 
in many American communities and helped 
propel Trump to the presidency. Making good on 
campaign promises, the president pulled out of the 
Trans-Pacifi c Partnership agreement, has proposed 
renegotiating the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and most recently has threatened high 
tariff s on Chinese imports, raising concerns about 
a trade war. 
An alternative view, which many economists 
embrace, holds that automation, not globalization, 
largely explains manufacturing’s relative 
employment declines and, in recent years, steep job 
losses. As evidence, proponents of this view point 
to statistics showing robust output growth and 
much higher productivity growth in manufacturing 
relative to the aggregate economy. Th is perspective 
oft en is presented as the consensus view among 
economists and taken as fact in media reports. 
Th e view, however, refl ects a misreading of 
the data. Although automation is occurring in 
manufacturing, as in other sectors of the economy, 
neither the descriptive nor the research evidence 
supports the view that automation was the leading 
cause of the relative and absolute decline in 
manufacturing employment in the 2000s. 
Th e Collapse of Manufacturing Employment in 
the 2000s
Manufacturing employment trended upward in 
the years following World War II, peaking at over 
19 million in 1979. From 1979 to 1989, the year 
of the next business cycle peak, manufacturing 
shed 1.4 million jobs, or 7.4 percent of its base, 
with job losses concentrated in the primary metals 
and textile and apparel industries. Employment in 
manufacturing was relatively stable in the 1990s. 
Manufacturing employment plunged in the 
2000s. Between the business cycle peaks of 2000 
and 2007, the sector’s employment dropped by 3.4 
million, or 20 percent. Although employment in 
manufacturing, a cyclically sensitive sector, oft en 
drops sharply during recessions, the early 2000s 
marked the fi rst time that employment in the 
sector did not entirely or largely recover during the 
expansion. Manufacturing employment was hard-
hit again during the Great Recession of 2008–2009, 
rebounding only slightly during the ensuing 
recovery. In total, since 2000, manufacturing 
employment has fallen by nearly 5 million, or over 
28 percent. Unlike the declines experienced in 
the 1980s, the job losses have been broad-based, 
aff ecting all industries. 
Widespread plant closures accompanied 
the employment declines. From 2000 to 2014, 
The Decline of U.S. 
Manufacturing Employment— 
Automation and Trade 
Susan N. Houseman
Rapid productivity growth in 
the computer industry—and, by 
extension, the strong productivity 
growth in manufacturing—largely 
refl ects improvements in high-tech 
products, not automation.
This article is based on “Understanding the 
Decline in Manufacturing Employment” 
(Houseman 2018).
the number of manufacturing 
establishments dropped by more than 
78,000, a 22 percent decline. 
Th e Puzzle
Refl ecting stable or declining 
employment in the manufacturing 
sector, the share of private sector 
employment in manufacturing has 
dropped steadily, and relative declines 
have been particularly prominent since 
the 1980s. Manufacturing employment 
as a share of private sector employment 
peaked at 35 percent in 1953; by 2016, 
that share had fallen to just under 
10 percent. Manufacturing’s share of 
private sector GDP has experienced 
a parallel decline: manufacturing’s 
contribution to private sector GDP 
peaked at 33 percent in 1953, and by 
2016 its share was just 13 percent.1 Th e 
trends in these shares, depicted in the 
right scale of Figure 1, suggest that 
performance in the manufacturing 
sector has been weak relative to the rest 
of the economy.
Figure 1 also shows indices for 
the private sector and manufacturing 
real (infl ation-adjusted) GDP on the 
left  scale. Paradoxically, in view of 
manufacturing’s declining employment 
and GDP shares, real GDP growth in 
manufacturing has largely kept pace 
with that of the private sector overall. 
Only since the Great Recession has real 
output growth been noticeably slower 
in manufacturing than in the aggregate 
economy. 
Reconciling Manufacturing’s 
Declining Shares with Robust 
Output Growth
How can these apparently 
contradictory trends be reconciled? If 
real GDP growth for manufacturing 
has kept pace with real GDP growth 
in the aggregate economy yet 
manufacturing’s share of private sector 
GDP is falling, it must be the case that 
prices of manufactured goods have 
grown more slowly than the average 
growth in prices of goods and services 
in the economy. 
Similarly, manufacturing’s declining 
share of private sector employment 
results because manufacturing 
employment is growing more slowly 
than the average for the private sector. 
Th e relationships between labor, 
GDP, and productivity growth may 
be expressed as a simple accounting 
identity, which shows that the 
diff erence in the growth rates of labor 
employed in the aggregate private 
sector and in manufacturing is equal to 
the diff erence in their real GDP growth 
rates less the diff erence in their labor 
productivity growth rates.2
If manufacturing’s real GDP 
growth rate is approximately the 
same as the average for the private 
sector, as indicated in Figure 
1, then all, or virtually all, of 
manufacturing’s declining employment 
share is accounted for by higher 
labor productivity growth. Many 
economists have taken the patterns 
shown in Figure 1, and related 
descriptive evidence, to infer that 
the higher productivity growth in 
manufacturing—implicitly or explicitly 
assumed to refl ect automation—
has largely caused the relative and 
absolute declines of manufacturing 
employment. Even when some role for 
trade is recognized, it is deemed small, 
and the decline is taken as inevitable.3 
Broadly, there are two problems 
with this conclusion. First, the 
descriptive evidence is misleading 
and has been widely misinterpreted. 
Th e low growth in prices, strong real 
output growth, and high productivity 
growth in manufacturing are largely 
driven by one industry—computer 
and electronic products (hereaft er 
computer industry)—and refl ect the 
statistical adjustment of price defl ators 
of computers and semiconductors for 
improvements in product quality.
Second, as researchers widely 
recognize, accounting identities and 
other descriptive evidence per se 
cannot be used to draw inferences 
about the causes of the relative and 
absolute decline in manufacturing 
employment. Productivity growth 
does not by itself cause employment 
reductions and may refl ect many 
forces, including import competition 
and off shoring. 
I discuss each problem in turn. 
Figure 1: Manufacturing and Private Industry Real GDP; Manufacturing GDP and Employment Shares
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Th e Outsized Eff ect of the Computer 
Industry on Manufacturing Statistics
Many of the products produced in 
the computer industry have undergone 
substantial and rapid technical 
advances. Th e semiconductors 
embedded in our electronics, for 
example, are much more powerful 
today than they were a decade or even 
a year ago. Likewise, the computers 
and related devices that consumers 
and businesses buy today have much 
greater functionality than in the past. 
Th e statistical agencies account for the 
rapid improvements in product quality 
in the industry through adjustments 
to price defl ators; for some products, 
adjusted prices have declined rapidly 
over time. 
Adjusting product price defl ators 
in the computer industry for 
improvements in product quality, in 
turn, has large eff ects on the industry’s 
measured real GDP and productivity 
growth. Although the computer 
industry has always accounted for 
less than 15 percent of value-added 
in manufacturing, because of its 
extraordinary measured real GDP and 
productivity growth, it has an outsized 
eff ect on measured real output and 
productivity growth in the sector, 
skewing these statistics and giving a 
misleading impression of the health of 
American manufacturing.
Figure 2 displays indices of 
real GDP in the private sector and 
manufacturing, as published and 
omitting the computer industry. Th e 
computer industry has had large 
eff ects on measured real GDP growth 
in manufacturing since the 1980s. 
From 1979 to 2000, measured real 
GDP growth in manufacturing was 
97 percent of the average for the 
private sector; when the computer 
industry is dropped from both 
series, manufacturing’s real GDP 
growth rate is just 45 percent that of 
the private sector average. Between 
2000 and 2016, real GDP growth in 
manufacturing was 63 percent of 
the average private sector growth. 
Omitting the computer industry from 
each series, manufacturing’s measured 
real output growth is only about 0.2 
percent per year and just 12 percent of 
the average for the private sector in the 
2000s. Without the computer industry, 
measured real output in manufacturing 
was lower in 2016 than in 2007 at 
the start of the Great Recession. 
In addition, without the computer 
industry, labor productivity growth was 
no higher or only somewhat higher 
in manufacturing than in the private 
sector overall (Houseman 2018). 
Once the anomalous eff ects of 
the computer industry are excluded, 
descriptive data no longer provide 
prima facie evidence that higher 
rates of automation were primarily 
responsible for the long-term decline in 
manufacturing’s share of employment. 
Rather, they suggest that understanding 
the reasons for the slow output growth 
in manufacturing output is critical.
It is also important to recognize 
that the rapid productivity growth 
accompanying output growth in 
the computer industry has little to 
do with automation—production 
of computers and semiconductors 
has been automated for many years. 
Rather, rapid productivity growth 
in the industry—and, by extension, 
the strong productivity growth in 
manufacturing—largely refl ects 
improvements in high-tech products. 
Nor is the rapid growth in measured 
computer and semiconductor output 
a good indicator of the international 
competitiveness of domestic 
manufacturing of these products. 
As detailed in Houseman, Bartik, 
and Sturgeon (2015), the locus of 
production of these products has been 
shift ing to Asia, even as the industry 
was driving the apparent robust growth 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Interpreting productivity growth 
Labor productivity is measured 
as real GDP (the returns to capital 
and labor) divided by labor input 
(hours worked or employment). 
Labor productivity will increase if 
processes are automated—that is, if 
businesses invest in capital equipment 
and that equipment substitutes for 
workers in the production process. 
Measured growth in labor productivity, 
however, captures many factors 
besides automation. As just discussed, 
3
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 2: Real GDP, Private Industry and Manufacturing, with and without Computer Industry
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the strong productivity growth in 
the manufacturing sector has been 
driven by productivity growth in the 
computer industry, which largely stems 
from product improvements owing to 
research and development. 
In addition, manufacturers have 
outsourced many activities previously 
done in-house, either to domestic or 
foreign suppliers, or have shift ed their 
input sources to lower-cost, oft en 
foreign, providers. If the outsourced 
activities are primarily done by 
relatively low-paid workers, or if the 
outsourced labor is cheaper than 
the in-house labor, measured labor 
productivity will increase. Shift ing 
to lower-cost input sources will 
raise measured productivity as well 
(Houseman et al. 2011). 
International competition also 
may directly impact measured 
manufacturing productivity by 
aff ecting the composition of products 
produced and processes used in 
the United States. Th e industries 
and plants within industries most 
aff ected by increased competition 
from low-wage countries will likely 
be the most labor-intensive, raising 
measured labor productivity. For 
example, case study research on the 
impact of the wave of Asian furniture 
imports in the early 2000s shows 
that plant closures and employment 
declines were concentrated in the most 
labor-intensive furniture industries, 
and within industries less aff ected 
by imports, the most labor-intensive 
processes were off shored.4 
Productivity growth surged in 
some manufacturing industries during 
the early 2000s, a period marked by a 
precipitous decline in manufacturing 
employment and factory closures. A 
superfi cial reading of the data might 
lead one to conclude that productivity 
in the form of automation caused 
the relative and absolute declines 
in manufacturing employment. Yet 
given the massive structural change 
occurring at the time, accelerated 
productivity growth may largely refl ect 
changes in the composition of products 
Susan N. Houseman is vice president and director of 
research at the Upjohn Institute.
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produced and processes done in the 
United States, and may have largely 
been a consequence of international 
trade. 
Discussion
Th e aggregate manufacturing 
output and productivity statistics, 
dominated by the computer industry, 
mask considerable weakness in most 
manufacturing industries, where real 
output growth has been much slower 
than in the private sector overall 
since the 1980s and has been anemic 
or declining since 2000. Because 
manufacturing has deep supply chains 
and accounts for a disproportionate 
share of R&D in the economy, the 
health of manufacturing industries has 
important implications for employment 
and output growth and innovation 
in the economy. Understanding the 
causes of the decline is necessary for 
developing sensible policy responses. 
Th e prevailing view that automation 
largely caused the swift  relative and 
absolute declines in U.S. manufacturing 
employment in the 2000s refl ects a 
misinterpretation of the numbers. 
Moreover, the automation view is not 
backed by rigorous research. Studies 
have failed to fi nd that automation was 
a signifi cant cause of the precipitous 
decline in manufacturing employment 
in the 2000s. And while industrial 
robots may have the potential 
to displace many workers in the 
future, any eff ects on manufacturing 
employment to date are small. 
A large and growing body of 
research has also examined the eff ects 
of trade on domestic manufacturing 
in the 2000s. No study captures all 
aspects of globalization and its eff ects 
on manufacturing and aggregate 
employment, and the limitations of any 
individual study need to be recognized. 
Collectively, however, the research 
points to sizable adverse eff ects from 
trade on employment, output, and 
investment.5 Th e denial by many in 
both the Republican and Democrat 
parties of globalization’s signifi cant role 
in manufacturing’s recent employment 
declines has inhibited much-needed, 
informed debate over trade policies. 
NOTES
1. GDP, also called value added, refl ects the 
contributions an industry or sector makes to 
output from its labor and capital. 
2. Formally, ??? ? ??? ? ?????? ? ??????  
? ?????? ? ?????? , where the T and M 
subscripts indicate the total private and 
manufacturing sectors, and ???, ???? , and ????  
represent the growth rates in labor, GDP, 
and labor productivity, respectively. 
3. See, for example, DeLong, Brad. 2017. 
“NAFTA and Other Trade Deals Have Not 
Gutted American Manufacturing—Period.” 
Vox Media. I provide additional citations in 
Houseman (2018).
4. See Holmes, Th omas J. 2011. “Th e Case 
of the Disappearing Large-Employer 
Manufacturing Plants: Not Much of a 
Mystery Aft er All.” Economic Policy Paper 
11-4. Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis.
5.  I provide an overview and citations 
to studies on automation and trade in 
Houseman (2018).
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In the past 15 years, four-year-
olds’ enrollment in state-funde d 
prekindergarten in the United States 
has more than doubled, with roughly 
one-third now enrolled. Advocates 
have pushed for further expansion; for 
example, New York City Mayor Bill de 
Blasio in 2014 implemented a universal 
pre-K program. 
Although researchers have found 
that early childhood programs from 
decades ago had sizable benefi ts for 
students that lasted into adulthood, 
evidence from more recent (and less-
expensive) programs has been mixed. 
Moreover, recent studies have focused 
on a modest number of programs, 
oft en high-quality ones, in a few states. 
It is unclear whether the eff ects of 
previously studied programs generalize 
to the cheaper programs more 
commonly implemented.
We perform the fi rst national 
analysis of public pre-K’s eff ects 
on standardized test scores, special 
education assignment, and grade 
retention, using data from thousands 
of school districts throughout the 
country. We estimate the impacts of 
typical public school pre-K programs, 
as well as how impacts vary for districts 
of diff erent types.
Our analysis reveals the following:
1) Th e typical public pre-K 
program has no positive eff ects 
on 4th grade outcomes. We 
can rule out impacts from full 
pre-K adoption as small as 2 
percentiles in math and reading 
test scores and 3 percentage 
points in special education 
assignment and grade retention.
2) However, for districts in states 
with high-quality programs 
(based on prior assessment by 
other experts), pre-K boosts 4th 
grade math test scores by 2.8 
percentiles, twice the necessary 
threshold to pass a benefi t-cost 
test in terms of predicted future 
earnings of students.
3) For districts with majority 
African American enrollment, 
pre-K program eff ects are even 
larger, with increases of 5.9 
percentiles in math and 3.8 
percentiles in reading. Among 
such districts in high-quality 
states, the increases are 6.6 and 
7.4 percentiles, respectively.
Whereas many prior studies looking 
at high-quality programs analyzed what 
a pre-K program could do under the 
right circumstances, we look at what 
typical pre-K programs have done in 
practice over the past two decades.  Th e 
typical public school pre-K program, 
which may have been of relatively poor 
quality, has done little for the average 
student. But these programs have 
substantively large benefi ts when they 
are either higher quality or operated in 
more disadvantaged school districts. 
Because much of the current policy 
debate is about the desirability of 
large-scale expansion of pre-K, these 
fi ndings are highly policy relevant. For 
large-scale expansion of pre-K to make 
sense, policymakers must keep the 
quality up. If funds are more limited, 
pre-K should be targeted. 
Analyzing Public School Pre-K across 
Th ousands of Districts
To evaluate pre-K programs in 
public school districts, we need data on 
both pre-K enrollments and academic 
outcomes for many districts. We get 
both from the U.S. Department of 
Education. Pre-K enrollment is readily 
5
Pre-K Eff ectiveness 
at a Large Scale
Timothy J. Bartik and Brad Hershbein
This article is based on a working paper titled 
“Pre-K in the Public Schools: Evidence from within 
U.S. States.” The paper is available at http://
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/285/.
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
 In states with high-quality programs, there is a signifi cant 
gain of 2.8 percentiles on math tests.
 Pre-K programs can produce signifi cant medium-term
benefi ts, enough to pass a benefi t-cost test, but this is more
likely with high-quality programs or disadvantaged student 
populations.
publicly available for almost every 
district every year. We create a scale 
measure by dividing a district’s pre-K 
enrollment by its grade 1 enrollment. 
Since 1st grade enrollment is universal, 
this approximates the fraction of 
students in a district who were enrolled 
in pre-K each year. 
In the early 1990s, the typical (or 
median) school district had no pre-K, 
but the top tenth of districts had at least 
one-quarter of each year’s students in 
pre-K. By the 2007–2008 school year, 
the typical district had about one-fi ft h 
of its students attend pre-K, and the top 
tenth of districts had nearly 90 percent 
of their students attending pre-K.
Measuring academic outcomes 
at the district level is harder. We 
use confi dential data from the 
National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP), also known as the 
Nation’s Report Card, a nationally 
representative standardized test, with 
core subjects in math and reading for 
4th graders. Th ese data allow us to link 
average student outcomes at the school 
district level with the pre-K enrollment 
of the same districts fi ve years earlier—
when the tested 4th graders should 
have been of pre-K age. Although not 
every school district takes the NAEP 
every time it is administered, enough 
do that we have outcomes for math 
and reading test scores for more than 
5,000 school districts from the late 
1990s through 2013. (In the full paper, 
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we look at other available outcomes 
that pre-K may infl uence, particularly 
those that rely on socioemotional 
skills: the fraction of students in 
special education and the fraction who 
repeated a grade.)
Th e Eff ects of Public School Pre-K
We estimate the impact of pre-K 
by comparing changes in outcomes 
among districts that expanded 
pre-K with changes in outcomes for 
districts that did not expand pre-K. 
Th is strategy allows us to control 
for permanent diff erences across 
districts. We also statistically adjust for 
changing characteristics of districts, 
notably per-student spending, as well 
as of students, such as sex, race and 
ethnicity, participation in the federal 
assisted lunch program, and whether 
the student is an English-language 
learner. (Th e full paper provides details 
on methodology.)
Th e fi rst bar of Figure 1 shows 
the impact for a typical district of 
switching from no pre-K to full pre-K 
on math test score performance, 
measured in percentiles. Th e estimate 
of 0.2 means that moving from an 
environment in which none of a 
district’s students attend public pre-K 
to one in which all the students attend 
pre-K is expected to raise math test 
scores by 0.2 percentiles—a tiny eff ect 
that is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. What’s more, although 
all statistical estimates come with a 
margin of error, the margin on this 
estimate is small enough that we 
can rule out eff ects as slight as 1.5 
percentiles. As discussed below, this 
upper bound is just barely at the level 
needed to balance future social benefi ts 
(through higher future earnings of 
students) with program costs; it is 
also well below the benefi t-cost ratio 
estimated for earlier, high-quality 
programs, such as Perry Preschool and 
the Chicago Child Parent Center.
However, states vary considerably 
in their funding and regulation 
of public pre-K programs, from 
per-pupil spending to necessary 
teacher credentials to teacher pay to 
curriculum. District implementation 
will vary within states, but is likely 
to be higher in states with stronger 
requirements. Drawing from expert 
opinion and fi ndings from previous 
research, we identifi ed—prior to our 
analysis—fi ve states likely to have high-
quality pre-K programs: Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and Oklahoma. Th e second 
bar in Figure 1 shows the impact of 
public school pre-K for districts in 
these fi ve states. At 2.8 percentiles from 
switching from no pre-K to full pre-K, 
it is much larger than the impact for 
the typical district across all states and 
easily passes a benefi t-cost test. Quality 
clearly matters for eff ectiveness.
Additionally, among previous 
studies of smaller-scale early childhood 
education programs, the largest eff ects 
have generally been found for those 
that target heavily disadvantaged 
students. In the last two columns, we 
show pre-K impacts among districts 
that are majority African American, 
overall and within high-quality states. 
Th ese districts, whether they are urban 
or rural, oft en have high poverty rates: 
roughly three-quarters of students are 
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch 
in the typical district. Pre-K eff ects 
in these districts are substantively 
large, at 5.8 percentiles overall and 6.6 
percentiles in districts in high-quality 
states. Although not shown in the 
fi gure, we also fi nd large impacts on 
reading scores of 3.8 percentiles overall 
and 7.4 percentiles among districts in 
high-quality states. Th e magnitude of 
these eff ects is consistent with earlier 
studies of smaller programs; we show 
that similar eff ects are found for larger-
scale public programs.
Overall, these pre-K impacts are 
consistent with a reasonable story. 
Pre-K in the average district for the 
typical student is of insuffi  ciently high 
quality to create large positive benefi ts. 
However, pre-K is of suffi  ciently high 
quality on average to create benefi ts for 
some disadvantaged students—notably, 
for students in majority-black school 
Figure 1  Pre-K Boosts 4th Grade Math Test Scores More When It’s High-Quality and in Heavily 
African American Districts
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NOTE: The fi gure shows the estimated gain in percentiles for 4th grade math test scores when a school district of the 
indicated type shifts from no pre-K enrollment to full pre-K enrollment for the cohort. Pre-K enrollment is measured 
fi ve years prior to 4th grade test scores.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress and Common Core of Data. 
See the working paper for full details.
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districts. Furthermore, in high-quality 
states, pre-K can create benefi ts for 
broader groups of students.
Factors to Keep in Mind When 
Evaluating Pre-K Programs
Only modest impacts are 
necessary for pre-K to have predicted 
long-term benefi ts greater than 
costs. Th e average state-funded pre-K 
program costs about $5,700 per 
student per year. Research shows that 
a 1-percentile increase in 4th grade 
test scores raises lifetime earnings by 
about $4,000. If pre-K boosts average 
test scores by just 1.4 percentiles, 
the expected future earnings gains 
are enough to pay for the cost of the 
program. Detecting these small eff ects 
requires a lot of data, as in the current 
analysis.
Pre-K eff ects can fade in middle 
grades before returning later in life. 
Many studies have found eff ects of 
pre-K immediately aft er the program, 
but that these eff ects partially fade 
out during the late elementary and 
middle school years. Older programs 
have shown positive eff ects returning 
in adulthood, such as greater earnings 
and less contact with the criminal 
justice system. Th ese patterns may 
occur if pre-K has lasting impacts on 
hard-to-detect socioemotional skills, 
but test scores are highly dependent 
on curriculum, which converges for 
students regardless of pre-K exposure. 
Our analysis cannot speak to the 
possibility of the average public pre-K 
program having long-term eff ects; 
therefore, our analysis is conservative.
Children not attending public 
pre-K may be attending another 
early childhood education program. 
Th e well-publicized evaluation of the 
Head Start Impact Study found little 
net impact later in elementary school. 
Subsequent research, however, found 
that this was because many children 
not assigned to Head Start attended 
another program instead; Head Start 
eff ects were much greater relative to 
students who attended no program. 
In our context, it is likely that some 
children not attending public school 
pre-K were attending private preschool 
or a standalone Head Start center. In 
our analysis, we statistically control 
for the availability of Head Start and 
private preschool slots geographically 
close to each public school district; 
these controls do not change our 
fi ndings.
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solely attributable to the authors. We thank 
the Russell Sage Foundation for its generous 
support.
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